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principles."' 4 2 Obviously, the finding of facts is a crucial step in

achieving substantial justice for parties in administrative proceedings.
*The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Cinderella recognized
the necessity for steering a course between according the findings of

the hearing examiner a significance which might impair the policymaking function of the agency involved and completely ignoring those

findings, thereby prejudicing the legitimate claims of parties and
degrading the. important function of the hearing examiner in the

administrative process. What is required of the agency is a delicate
exercise of restraint and a fine sensitivity not only to its own role in the
application of administrative law but also to those of the trial
examiner and the reviewing court. Cinderella's restatement of the
* applicable legal principles should clarify the problems involved and
serve as protection for rights affected by the very significant power of

an agency to find the facts.
VIII.

JUDICIAL REVIEW-RIGHT OF REVIEW

Standing to Seek JudicialReview

Prior to 1970, two primary methods for obtaining standing to
appeal a decision of a federal administrative agency existed.'

Appellants could allege an invasion of an interest protected by the
3
common law 2 or assert statutory authorization for judicial review.
Allegations of both were labeled "legal rights," a term defined by the
Supreme Court in Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA 4 as rights of property,
142. Address by Charles Evans Hughes before the Federal Bar Association, quoted In
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

135, 136 (1938).

I. Note, Standing to Challenge FederalAdministrative Actions in the Wake ofAssociation
of Data ProcessingService Orgainzations, Inc. v. Camp, I LOYOLA U. (CHI.) L.J. 285, 289
(1970). The question should be distinguished from the ability of persons to intervene in
administrative proceedings. Intervention is controlled by agency regulations; hence, permission
to intervene is not necessarily recognition that a petitioner is a sufficiently aggrieved party for
standing purposes. FPC Order Issuing Preliminary Permit and Granting Petition to Intervene,
Project No. 2702 (Nov. 18, 1970). See ANCILLARY MATrERS section of the Project supra.
2. Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964)
("any person who will be adversely affected by such an order may obtain judicial review");
Federal Power Commission Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964) ("any party. . . aggrieved by an
order. . . may obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals"). But see
Sugar Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C. § 1136 (1964), for an example of statutory preclusion of judicial
review.
4. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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rights arising out of contracts or protected against tortious invasion,

or rights founded on a statute conferring a privilege.' Until recently,
few statutes expressly provided standing;6 thus, most of the law in this

area has been based on judicial interpretation. 7
The difficulty in precisely determining when a legal right has been

violated has resulted in a judicial expansion of the legal right concept
in two ways. First, a legal right or interest-one protected by law-is
any right to which a court grants protection.' The Supreme Court has
exploited the circularity of this concept by substantially expanding the
functional definition provided by Tennessee Power on several
occasions.' Second, a finding of standing under the legal interest
standard may require a. determination on the merits10 since courts
must often rule on the existence of a statutorily granted privilege in
order to recognize the appellant's legal right." Obviously, however,
2
the determination of the privilege may be dispositive of the case. If
so, the concept of standing has been expanded in this instance to
include the substantive cause of action as well as the preliminary issue

of justiciability.
In addition to expanding the definition of "legal right," courts
have also broadened the accessibility to standing by carving out
3
certain well known exceptions to the legal interest requirement.
Notable examples of this judicial liberalization are competitors'
challenges to administrative decrees14 and actions which are brought
5. Id. at 137.
6. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970); Communications
Act of 1934,48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1964).
7. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 502 (1965) [hereinafter

cited as JAFFE].
8. 3 K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 22.04, at 222 (1958). But see JAFFE 501.

9. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Chicago v. Atchison,
T.&S.F.Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1957). The Supreme Court proffered an open-ended mode of
liberalizing the legal interest test in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,476-77
(1940), where it indicated that a previously recognizedlegal right is not essential to standing. See
also Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv.601,629 (1968).
10. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
I1.See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1970). For an example of a case where the
cause of action was merged into the determination of standing, see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940).
12. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1970).
13. A few courts have retained the legal interest standard in its original form. See, e.g.,
Rasmussen v. Hardin, 27 AD. L.2D 269 (D. Ariz. 1970); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v.
HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
14. See Matson Nav. Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 405 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1968);
B. SCHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185-86 (1962). But cf.
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to vindicate a public right. 15 These exceptions to the standard have
irfcreasingly resulted in allowing standing to persons adversely
affected by agency action regardless of the existence of strictly defined
16
legal rights.
In 1968 the Supreme Court tacitly recognized the judicial trend
toward liberalization of standing by its decision in Flast v. Cohen.'7 In
Flast, the Court noted that the test of standing focused on the party
seeking review, rather than the interest being asserted. 8 This emphasis
on the party rather than the issue indicates a fundamental shift away
from the legal interest standard. 9
In 1970, the Supreme Court continued this process of
liberalization in Association of Data Processing Service
Comment, Competitor's Standing to Challenge Administrative Action-Recent Federal

Developments, 48 N.C.L. REv. 807, 820-21 (1970). If the competition fostered by the agency
was illegal, the injured competitor would have standing despite the absence of a legal right to be
free from competition. See Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969); West Coast Constr.
Co. v. Oceano Sanitary Dist., 311 F. Supp. 378, 381 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
15. See generally JAFFE 459-501. Courts often recognize the standing of persons who do not
possess-a legal right but have suffered injury due to agency action alleged to be arbitrary or in
excess of statutory authority. Such an action is dependent upon the existence of a statute
intended to protect the public interest. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966). The appellant is said to be acting as a private attorney general in his representation
of the public and presentation of his personal interest. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694 (2d Cir.), vacated on suggestion of mootness per curiam, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).

16. See, e.g., Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gonzalez v.
Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574-75 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Davis, supra note 9, at 629.
17. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
18. The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated
... . [W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular
issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable ....
[Tihe question of standing is related only to whether the dispute.
will be presented
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution. Id. at 99-101.
Prior to this decision and, to some extent after it, many courts emphasized the nature of the
issues of a case as an aspect of standing. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946);
Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 27 AD. L.2D 219 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Bickel, The Supreme Court.
1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 75-76 (1961).
19. The determination of a legal right has often been resolved through examination of the
merits. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text. The shift from issue orientation and its
resultant liberalization of standing has been dramatized by the Court's unwillingness, since the
Flast decision, to dismiss a case for lack of standing. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 450,457 (1970).

Vol. 1971:149]

A DMINISTRA TI VE LA W-1970

Organizations v. Camp20 and Barlow v. Collins.2' The Court altered
its focus by establishing two new requirements for standing:

allegations of injury in fact and assertion of an interest that is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by

the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.2 2 Injury in fact
would satisfy the case or controversy requirement of article I II of the
Constitution,21 while the "zone of interests" test would provide the

courts with a tool to limit their caseload to controversies involving
substantial legal questions pertinent to the legislative or constitutional

schemes involved. 2 Following these decisions, many commentators
expressed the view that the Court had opened the doors to judicial

relief for a larger class of litigants.25
Some Judicial Reactions to Data Processing and Barlow. An
examination of only a few of the lower court decisions since Data

Processing and Barlow will illustrate the diverse judicial reaction to
the Supreme Court's rulings. For example, the Courts of Appeal for

the Fifth Circuit, Third Circuit, and the District of Columbia have
faithfully applied the Data Processing-Barlow tests. 26 However, in

Sierra Club v. Hickel27 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
20. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
21. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
22. 397 U.S. at 152-53. See generally 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1276 (1970). At least one
Federal court of appeals has restricted application of the Data Processing requirements to
challenges of administrative activity. Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers &Helpers Local 610,
F.2d - (8th Cir. 1971).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. See 397 U.S. at 153-54. The "injury in fact" requirement may also have been partially
motivated by judicial policy considerations, such as limiting the number of persons eligible to
seek judicial relief. See 23 VAND. L. REv. 814, 821 (1970). However, this would be inconsistent
with the Court's announced policy of enlarging the class of persons eligible to seek judicial review to protest administrative action. 397 U.S. at 154-55.
25. E.g., Davis, supra note 19; 1 LoYoLA U. (Cm.) L.J., supra note 2, at 297; The Wall St.
Journal, Mar. 4, 1970, at 3, col. 1. Contra, 23 VAND. L. REv. 814 (1970), where the writer
argues that the Data Processing-Barlowtest is no different than the legal interest test. He
contends that in order to succeed on the merits under Data Processing-Barlowone must still
show that a legal right-as opposed to an interest-has been violated.
26. E.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lodge
1858, AFGE v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir.
1970); Harry H. Price &Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, F.2d (5th Cir. 1970). But see Ballerina
Pen Co, v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Ballerinacase is discussed infra at notes
82-85 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
however, has not followed the Supreme Court's standard without vigorous dissent against the
majority's methodology, though not its result. See Lodge 1858, AFGE v. Paine, 436 F.2d at 898
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring).
27. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1971) (No.
939). Although the court failed to find standing in this case, the test used in making the
determination constitutes the basis of liberalization.
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substantially expanded the Supreme Court's standards. Referring to
the "zone of interests" test, that court noted:
The significance of the language is not entirely clear.. .. We submit that it
does not establish a test separate and apart from or in addition to the test which
the court first looked to in Camp. . . . Injury in fact is the test which will
reconcile most if not all of the decided cases. . . . "Standing to sue" as the
phrase indicates, refers to the posture of the plaintiff and not to the "legal
interests" to be unravelled.-3

In contrast to this movement toward a more liberal interpretation,
in Crowther v. Seaborg2l a federal district court moved in the opposite
direction by completely disregarding the Supreme Court's two-tier
standard and declaring that appellants must show an interest
"entitled to legal protection which is in some way threatened with
logical directness by the agency action." The court determined that
the health and safety interests of local property owners provided them
with standing to challenge underground atomic testing by the A EC,
an analysis clearly focusing on the interests rather than the parties
asserting them.3'
In ContractorsAssociation of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary
of Labor 32 a Pennsylvania federal district court utilized analysis
similar to that developed in Sierra Club to find that a group of
contractors who were challenging federal hiring restrictions lacked
standing.-s The court noted that standing focuses on the party seeking
relief and ruled that an association of contractors could not show a
personal stake in the controversy, although the group's individual
members would have standing since the requirements affected them
"personally." 3

/

28. Id. at 31. The court used the "injury in fact" standard to examine the standing of the
Sierra Club, a nationwide conservation group, to challenge the action of the Secretary of the
Interior in granting a license to a private enterprise for commercial development of a national
park. The court ruled that there was no injury in fact which directly affected the members,
although the actions of the Secretary might be personally distasteful to them.
29. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). Plaintiff's brief in this action is reprinted in
PlaintiffsBrief in the Project Rulison Case, 55 CORNELL L. REV.761 (1970).
30. 312 F. Supp. at 1212.
31. Somewhat inconsistently, however, the court denied the standing of another appellant
who was not a local property owner by focusing on the personal stake of the party seeking relief.
Id. at 1218.
32. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
33. The hiring requirements were prescribed in all federal contracts and federally assisted
construction projects as part of the controversial Philadelphia plan dealing with the hiring of
minority-race workers.
34. Id. at 1007. Portions of the opinion focus on the ultimate issue presented by the plaintiff
and determine that it is fit for judicial resolution. Whether this consideration is a reversion to a
legal interest standard or an aspect of the case or controversy requirement bound up in an
examination of adverseness is not resolved by the court. Id. at 1006, 1007.
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The remaining sections of this commentary will consider the
varying constructions which have been and might be placed upon the
zone of interests, injury in fact, and "public interest action" tests;
evaluate and attempt to balance the policy considerations underlying
the concept of standing; and make recommendations to clarify the law
in this complex area.
The Zone of Interests Requirement. The breadth of the "zone of
interests" test for standing depends on the interpretation which lower
courts give to the phrase "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute" enunciated in Data Processing.
The most liberal interpretation is that which the Ninth Circuit used in
Sierra Club in concluding that the Supreme Court could not have
meant the "zone of interests" test to be more than a restatement of
the injury in fact requirementa 5 Any doubts over the test to be applied
should have been resolved by the application of the Data Processing
rationale in Barlow, decided on the same day.36
Another method which some courts have used to liberalize the
"zone of interests" test involves requiring a detailed judicial
investigation of each statute for congressional intent. A prime
example of this approach is Lodge 1858, AFGE v. Paine3 7 where
employees of NASA challenged the action of that agency in firing
civil service employees while retaining contract workers. The court
of appeals found that the plaintiffs met the "zone of interests"
requirement after examining not only the statute creating the agency
in question and the scheme of applicable civil service laws but also
recent congressional deliberations involving relevant statutes. 3 The
court concluded that the statutory scheme was designed to protect the
employment interests of civil service workers.39 The willingness of the
35. See 433 F.2d at 31-32.

36. In fact, the Court's application of the Data Processing standard in Barlow clearly
demonstrates an intention that the "zone of interests" test be a separate consideration from
injury in fact. The court goes so far as to number the tests and consider them separately. Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). The Court points out in Barlow that injury in fact satisfies
the article III requirements of standing. Id. In Data Processing the Court stated that
"[s]tanding concerns, apart from the case or controversy test, the question whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 397 U.S. at 153. The
treatment accorded the two standards indicates that the court did not intend one to be a

restatement of the other.
37. 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

38. Id.at 893.
39. Id. Accord, Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 426 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970). There the
Court of Claims declared that if a "regulation appears intended to define and state the rights
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court in Lodge 1858 to look beyond a statute to a statutory scheme

and subsequent congressional consideration of that scheme, added to
the court's willingness to flexibly consture the term "protect,"
resulted in perhaps the most liberal interpretation of the "zone of
interests" requirement since Data Processingand Barlow.

A similar approach was taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin,4" where a
tomato repacker and wholesaler were held to have standing to
challenge marketing orders of the Secretary of Agriculture. The

Agricultural Marketing Act, which authorized the Secretary to
establish marketing regulations for commodities regulated by the
Act, 41 was found by the court to declare a policy of protecting the
interests of the farmer and the consumer by providing orderly

marketing conditions.4 2 Although the court admitted that the
appellant was only indirectly affected by these regulations, it
determined that their indirect impact was sufficient to bring him
within the applicable zone of interests.43 Apparently, the court
reasoned that Congress intended to regulate persons occupying the

immediate appellant's status as incident to the establishment of
orderly marketing procedures. The court did not refer to any

legislative history or statutory provision which specifically regulated
repackers or wholesalers; rather, reliance was placed on what
44
Congress must have intended to regulate.

A third method for liberalization of the "zone of interests"
requirement was noted by the Third Circuit in National Welfare
Rights Organization v. Finch45 where the appellants suggested that
of a class of persons, it is presumptively intended to benefit those persons." Id. at 317. See
also Fletcher v. United States, 392 F.2d 266, 270-71 (Ct. Cl. 1968). It is a simple matter to
equate the intent to benefit and the intent to protect or regulate which is discussed in Data
Processing.National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
40. 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 601 etseq. (1964).
42. 425 F.2d at 1138.
43. Id. at 1140-41. A statute provides for application of marketing orders to handlers and
processors, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(l) (1964), but the court did not discuss the possibility that this
might be a direct regulation of Hardin.
44. The court of appeals also dismissed another possible interpretation of the "zone of
interests" standard. Noting that the appellant's complaint showed that he had suffered
economic injury and that his interests were within the proper zone of interests, the court warned
that merely because a complaint alleges an interest to be within the proper zone of interests does
not mean that it is "arguably" within that zone. Id. at 1140. The court does not delineate what
standard it would use, however, to determine the burden of pleading at this stage by the term
"arguably."
45. F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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the "zone of interests" requirement ray be replaced by a showing of
invasion of a legal right.46 Reasoning that legal rights cannot be taken
without due process of law, appellants argued that the holder of such a
right would have standing by virtue of the Fifth Amendment
regardless of a congressionally conferred source of standing. To the
extent that legal rights are not within the proper "zone of interests,"
the Data Processing-Barlowrequirements could thus be further
liberalized. Unfortunately, the court did not reach this hypothesis in
47
its disposition of the case.
The problem of determining legislative intent, a subject which has
caused difficulty in many areas of law, looms as the central obstacle
to applying the "zone of interests" standard." In recognition of this
difficulty courts may prefer a broad standard for determining
congressional intent in their application of the "zone of interests"
standard. The "zone of interest" test could be interpreted to refer to
any interest which Congress conceivably could have intended to
protect. The rationale for such a rule would be that congressional
intent is often unfathomable since it is frequently unarticulated.4 9 This
technique would include a rebuttable presumption that Congress
intended to regulate or protect an interest if the interest actually
received regulation or protection under the statute. The presumption
could be overcome by a showing that Congress had specifically denied
the intention.
The same policy reasons could also justify a court's action in
eliminating congressional intent from its consideration altogether.
Such a rule would necessitate interpreting "to be protected or
regulated"' as referring to any interest which is in fact regulated or
protected, whether or not the regulation or protection was intended or
even foreseen by Congress. So long as the effect of the statute was
regulation or protection of an interest, the "zone of interests"
requirement would be satisfied; application of this rule would be
unaffected by congressional demonstrations of contrary intent. Such
an approach would be more difficult to justify under the relevant
portions of the Administrative Procedure Act,51 since that Act
46. Id. at ______,
n.33.
47. Id. at
48. See Stringbam, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in Action, 47 A.B.A.J. 466 (1961).

49. Id. at 470.
50. These are the words of the "'zone of interests" requirement as articulated by the
Supreme Court. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970).
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provides standing to persons adversely affected or aggrieved "within
52
the meaning of a relevant statute."
From the many interpretations of the "zone of interests" test
available to federal courts, it appears that, without further guidance
from the Supreme Court, standing will become a matter of judicial
discretion, the result varying from case to case and from court to
couirt.0 Due to its flexibility, the "zone of interests" requirement will
be a force for liberalization of standing if there is a strong judicial
trend in this direction. But to the extent that standing is used as a
judicial device to further external policy biases by limiting judicial
forums, it may arbitrarily exclude deserving plaintiffs.s
The Injury in Fact Requirement. Injury in fact is as potentially
subject to judicial discretion in interpretation as is the "zone of
interests" requirement. The Second Circuit recognized as early as
1965 that article III did not require an aggrieved or adversely affected
party to have a personal interest.5 This ruling encouraged many
federal courts to grant standing to such collective organizations as the
-Road Review League-7 and the Sierra Club." The Federal District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in Pennsylvania
9 noted that the
Environmental Council v. Bartlett"
environmental
group suffered the requisite injury in fact, enabling them to present
issues in an adversary context which were capable of judicial
resolution. 0 The court observed that the complaining groups suffered
52. Id. § 702 (emphasis added).
53. A discussion of the concept of discretionary standing is found in Project, Federal
Administrative Law Developments-1969 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 198-99. Other conceivable
interpretations of the "zone of interests" requirement are noted in Comment, JudicialReviewof
Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REv.540 (1971).
54. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 14 at 186; Conference Foundation Letter, Sept. 30, 1969.
55. See JAFFE 503.

56. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965). This

position conflicted with the traditional view that a personal stake was requisite to standing. See
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (195 1).
57. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The League was a

nonprofit association which concerned itself with highway locations and here challenged the
placing of a freeway.
58. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). The
Sierra Club is a national nonprofit conservation agency which here challenged the location of a
proposed expressway.
59. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
60. Id. at 245. A similar determination was made by the District of Columbia Circuit in a

suit by citizens and users of Florida recreational facilities to enjoin the building of the CrossFlorida Barge Canal. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,
(D.D.C. 1971).

-

F. Supp.
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injury as citizens, sportsmen, and environmentalists with regard to
construction by a government agency which moved a streambed. This
willingness of some courts to find the requisite "personal" interest in
groups has been a major liberalization of the injury in fact concept.
Not all courts, however, have acknowledged standing in the
absence of a personal stake. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
South Hill Neighborhood Association v. Romney6 considered the
standing of nonprofit corporations desiring the preservation of
historic buildings ordered demolished by an urban renewal authority.
The court ruled that when such corporations did not own the
buildings in controversy or property nearby, or submit a
redevelopment plan for the area, they had no standing. 2 The
submission of a redevelopment plan demonstrated the necessary
participation in the administrative process needed to show an actual
interest in the litigation. By demanding merely that groups without
obvious interests demonstrate their adverseness by prior participation
in the administrative process, the court's standards do not appear
unreasonable.
Standing for organizations received an even more restrictive ruling
in Contractors Association. There, an organization complained of
harm to its members resulting from agency action, 3 and the court
ruled that only the members, not the organization, would have
standing. The rationale employed to reach this result was that the
organization lacked the requisite personal stake in the controversy. It
is, however, logically difficult to deny that an organization composed,
of sufficiently adverse parties would not be sufficiently adverse in
itself. This restrictive standard was applied in a situation where injury
in fact was the sole criterion of standing" and may thus reflect a
judicial tendency to narrow the meaning of injury in fact in order to
impede the transition from the legal interest test to a strict injury in
fact standard.
5 the Court of Appeals
In Sierra Club v. Hickel,1
for the Ninth
Circuit also adopted injury in fact as a singular test for standing and
61. 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
62. Id. at 460-61 (adopted Dist. Ct. memo). Contrast the willingness of the District Court of

the District of Columbia to accept indirect injury as sufficient in fulfilling the injury in fact
requirement. Nader v. Volpe, 320 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1970).
63. The agency had issued contract specifications in accord with the racial hiring
requirements of the Philadelphia Plan. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
64. This assumes that the court did not intend the determination of a proper issue to be an
aspect of standing. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
65. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
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construed the phrase narrowly. The Ninth Circuit indicated that there
might be varying degrees of invaded interests-some sufficient for
standing and some not:
We do not believe such Club concern without a showing of more
direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge
the exercise of responsibilities . . . by two . . . officials of the government
'S

The court in Sierra Club did not deny that the club had an invaded
interest; it merely denied that the interest was direct.
Clearly, the Data Processing aecision, even absent the "zone of
interests" requirement, carries the potential to greatly constrict the
scope of standing. By redefining the limits of injury in fact and its
application to possible plaintiffs, courts may alter the availability of
the judicial forum for reasons extrinsic to the preliminary issue of
standing and thereby exclude whole classes of plaintiffs. Without
more objective criteria by which to ascertain standing, the
opportunities for arbitrary exclusion from the full benefits of the
judicial process remain open.
An Alternative Basis for Standing. Objection to the Data
Processing-Barlowstandard on the ground that it excludes deserving
plaintiffs from a judicial forum necessarily assumes that standard to
be exclusive. However, the Supreme Court in Data Processing
indicated that an alternative ground for standing was not precluded
by its decisions:
66'. Id. at 30. On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit has now indicated that the individual
members of an environmental organization may have standing when the organization does not.
Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, F.2d (9th Cir. 1971). Though a
corporation and thus a legal entity apart from its members, the organization owned no property,
real or personal, and hence could not allege injury in fact. To the extent that the members owned
property in the area of controversy, they were allowed standing. Id. at
67. Id. at 32-33. Injury in fact may be further limited in a different way. Beginning with the
assumption that injury in fact can only occur when a right is violated, disappointment arguably
becomes injury only when the frustration has a pecuniary value. See Dugan, Standing, The New
Property, and the Costs of Welfare: Dilemmas in American and West German ProviderAdministration, 45 WAsH. L. lav. 497, 515 (1970). Pecuniary value, however, is unique to
protected rights or interests. Id. Thus, while the concept of injury implies an objective
determination, it bypasses the underlying consideration of values on which the concept is based.
The weakness of the theory is in the assumption that pecuniary value is unique to protected
rights. Injury can be premised on other values. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Hence, the premise of the theory is under-inclusive.
However, a court might apply the suggested reasoning to those frustrations which do have
pecuniary value underpinnings.
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The third test mentioned by the Court of Appeals, which rests on an explicit
provision in a regulatory statute conferring standing and is commonly referred
to in terms of allowing suits by "private attorneys general," is inapplicable to
the present case."

The traditional analysis of the private attorney general approach
was that persons did not have standing to appeal an administrative
determination unless they could show that they were personally
aggrieved,69 but it has since been held that a plaintiff need not have
any personal interest to meet article III requirements.70 It was
sufficient that the statute at least implicitly authorized the plaintiff to
act as a private attorney general and that the only interest vindicated
71
be that of the public.

Many courts still follow the aforementioned traditional line of

cases and base standing to represent the public interest

72

on a

73

statutory authorization. In Peoples v. United Siates Department of
7 4
Agriculture
however, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit extended the public interest action doctrine by
declaring that presumptive standing would be given a complainant

who alleged that executive programs unlawfully deviated from
statutory requirements.75 Appellants had charged that the Secretary

of Agriculture was exceeding the statutory price for food stamps, and
the court required that the complainant be an intended but not a
primary beneficiary of the statutory provision. The importance of the
decision rested in the emphasis it placed on administrative illegality.
68. 397 U.S. 150, 153 n.I (1970).
69. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Perkins
v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); F. COOPER, 2 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 541

(1965).
70. See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943). In Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC,Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, pointed out:
These private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest.
.. . That a court is called upon to enforce public rights and not the interests of private
property does not diminish its power to protect such rights.

316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942); cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
71. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). But cf. Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,20 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. A more recent application of a suit in the public interest is Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court noted that
groups existed in every community which have a sufficient interest to have standing. The
important point is that they represent the public, not a narrow private interest. Id. at 1005.
73. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970);

Szmodis v. Romney, 307 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
74. 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 563.
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Similar emphasis was later used by the same court in another public

interest case. 6
In the area of competitor's suits, the District of Columbia Circuit

finally departed from the necessity for even statutory authorization in
National Association of Securities Dealers v. SEC.71 Emphasizing

dicta from an earlier decision, the court determined that the
appropriate question for judicial consideration was not so much
whether Congress iitended to benefit the plaintiff, as whether
Congress intended to leave the agency immunized from judicial
review.7 8 The court then ruled that a pleading of administrative

illegality and injury in fact would suffice to provide standing.
In Scanwell Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer" the Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit was again faced with a
competitor's suit. Noting that the "public interest" theory of
standing had developed due to the harshness of the legal interest

theory, the court elaborated on the administrative illegality
requirement and declared that the public interest specifically lies in
denying the agency freedom to exercise arbitrary powers.8e The test

for standing was again injury in fact and a sufficient adverse interest
on the part of the plaintiff. A third but unexplained requirement was

that the interest asserted by the complainant contain "otherwise
reviewable subject matter." 8'

The public interest theory of standing appears to have survived the
Data Processing and Barlow decisions. In Ballerina Pen Co. v.
76. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1966). The court's decision to expand standing to a consumer group was influenced
by the fact that if the consuming public was not heard to challenge the illegality, no one could
bring the action. Id.
77. 420 F.2d 83, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 99.
79. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Scanwell Laboratories, the plaintiff-appellant, an
unsuccessful bidder on an FAA contract, challenged the legality of agency action awarding the
contract to Cutler-Hammer, Inc., one of Scanwell's competitors. The plaintiff-appellant alleged
that Cutler-Hammer's bid was non-responsive to the IFB (invitation for bids) since CutlerHammer had not satisfied the prerequisites therein. Scanwell, therefore, sought to have the
contract award declared null and void as a violation of the statutory provisions controlling
government contracting. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Scanwell had standing to
bring the suit in district court. Id. at 860, 876.
. 80. Id. at 863. At least one federal court has explicitly refused to apply the analysis
suggested in Scanwell, and, ignoring Data Processing, has continued to apply the legal interest
formula. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co. v. Sandoval, 318 F. Supp. 1167 (1970).
8 I.
Id. at 872.
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Kunzig,12 another competitor's suit, the District of Columbia Circuit

was again faced with a complainant alleging arbitrary agency action
in violation of law. Although the court adopted the language
employed in Data Processing to articulate the proper tests for
standing,8 it also recognized standing upon a showing of injury in fact
and a prima facie showing of arbitrary action by the agency., Such

substitution of a showing of arbitrary action for the "zone of
interests" requirement means that standing is now theoretically

available in some courts to practically all plaintiffs who meet article
I I I requirements, since it is doubtful that anyone would bring an

action against an agency for exercising its legitimate powers.8

There is no compelling reason to restrict the liberalization of the
public interest theory to competitor's suits,m and the courts have not

yet suggested that it should be so restricted. In fact, the District of
Columbia Circuit has extended the theory to serve as a basis of

standing for persons suing to enjoin a governmental unit holding land
in trust from impermissibly diverting the use so as to destroy their

7
beneficial interests held in common with all other citizens.1

Superficially at least, this theory would seem to warrant a different
result from that of SierraClub. 8

Conclusion. Recent cases indicate that a trend toward
82. 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
83. Id. at 1207.
84. Judge Tamm had urged these same criteria upon the court only days earlier in Lodge
1858, AFGE v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion). In accord with the
majority's view in Ballerina Pen was the later case of Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v.
Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
[O]ne who alleges that an agency has acted arbitrarily or in excess of its authority in
denying him a government contract is a proper party to "satisfy the public interest in
having agencies follow the regulations which control government contracting." Id. at
1140.
85. The Court of Claims has now recognized the public interest theory as articulated in
Scanwell as a legitimate basis for standing. See Keco Indus. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233,
1237-38 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
86. Competitor suit standing is discussed in Comment, The Erosion of the Standing
Impediment in Challenges by Disappointed Bidders of Federal Government Contract Awards,
39 FORDHAM L. Rav. 103 (1970).
87. Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
88. The complainants in Sierra Club were in approximately the same position as those in
Allen. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. The major difference was that in Allen the
interest advanced was a first amendment right. 424 F.2d at 946-47. If this is a valid distinction,
the court appears to be reverting to an examination of the interest asserted as an aspect of
standing. Nevertheless, the court's analysis is significant. If each member of the public has a
personal beneficial interest in government-held property and governmental services, they may
also have an interest in the workings of government and its integrity.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:149

liberalization of standing exists with reference to the "zone of
interests" test and actions brought in the public interest. However,
injury in fact has provided a method of restriction for many courts,
and the lack of uniformity as to the judicial interpretation of standing
requirements is obvious. The issue of standing in federal courts has
thus become a legal quagmire, as one's ability to gain a judicial forum
is a function of the court before which one appears. Rather than
clarifying the appropriate standards, the recent Supreme Court
decisions have only renewed the earlier confusion.
The Court's rulings, however, have not gone without criticism.
Justice Brennan initiated the attack with his concurring opinion in
Data Processingand Barlow." Arguing that the majority's standards
would breed litigation and allow judges to use standing to "slam the
courthouse door" on plaintiffs who should be entitled to full
consideration of their claims on the merits, he advanced "injury in
fact" as a singular standard and asserted that the "zone of interests"
test was more suitable for reviewability than for standing." Professor
Davis has long advocated this position. 9' Davis argues that the "zone
of interests" test: does not aid many persons who should be given
judicial relief; is contrary to case law which demonstrates that a
function of the federal courts is to protect persons from the unlawful
action of government officers; is cumbersome and artificial and thus
does not allow the lower courts to give quick and clear answers due to
the difficulty in examining legislative history to find a congressional
intent to regulate or protect; and is contrary to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act which provides standing to parties who
can make a prima facie showing of injury in fact."2 Although the
policy justifications urged by Professor Davis support a broader
standard, injury in fact is clearly not the solution. As has been noted,93
injury in fact can be a grossly restrictive standard. Use of the APA to
89. 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970) (concurring opinion).

90. Id. at 178. Reviewability involves investigation ofstatutory language, legislative history,
and public policy to ascertain whether Congress has precluded or limited judicial review. Id. The

fundamental issue in reviewability is whether agency action should be deemed final. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 498-520 (1959). Standing, however, involves the issue of

determining the proper parties for litigation. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
91. See 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 8, § 22.04, at 222.
92. Davis, supra note 19, at 458-68. Although Professor Davis advances other arguments
against the "zone of interests" test, those listed contain the brunt of his assault. Davis had
adopted a contrary position toward the "zone of interests" test two years earlier. See Davis,
supra note 9, at 625.
93. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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justify a standing criterion ties one to its language, which Davis
interprets as requiring the injury in fact standard,94 whereas reliance
on equitable jurisdiction and its concepts of standing allow greater
flexibility. By examining the judicial policies which underlie standing
in federal courts, we may be able to develop more appropriate criteria
for equitable standing.
If the judicial policy to be maintained by standing is the
preservation of judicial discretion for judges to decide subjectively
who should be heard in a judicial forum, the policy is illegitimate. 5
Judges should not be allowed to make the availability of a forum
depend on their discretion. The protection of individual rights and the
enforcement of supremacy of law with regard to administrative
agencies requires the existence of a place in which the actions of
administrative agencies can be challenged.
If judicial policy is directed toward avoiding the introduction of
hypothetical suits, then the policy is superfluous, for other methods
exist to eliminate these from the judicial process. 7 Standing protects
against improper plaintiffs, not improper issues. Procedural devices
such as class suits, stays, consolidations of cases, and multidistrict
transfers exist to mitigate the effects of any increase in litigation
which might occur. 9
The Supreme Court has indicated that at least a part of the
standing requirement is constitutionally motivated by article III. In
Baker v. Carr'00 the court noted that the purpose of standing was "to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues." 10 1 In Flast v. Cohen 0 2 the Court defined the article III
requirement of standing as an assurance that the dispute "will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
94. See Davis, supra note 19, at 465-68.
95. See JAFFE 503. Perhaps the prime example of the use of standing to accomplish purposes

extrinsic to the preliminary matter of determining the proper parties to litigation is its use to
circumvent the difficult task of delineating the scope of an agency's discretion. 39

FORDHAM

L.

REv., supra note 86, at 108-09.
96. "Nothing has been held more fundamental to the Supremacy of Law than the right of
every citizen to bring the action of government officials to trial in the broad courts of the
common law." J. DICKERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 33, 35
(1927).
97. See Davis, supra note 19, at 469.
98. See Davis, supra note 9, at 635.
99. See 84 HARV. L. REv. 185 n.50 (1970). See generally 23 VAND. L. REV. 814, 821 (1970).
100. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
101. Id. at 204.
102. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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capable of judicial resolution."e 3 Adverseness is the key concept
which the Court emphasizes in delineating standing criteria. In Data
Processingthe Court indicated that injury in fact would provide the
essential adverseness for standing.""s Injury in fact is not necessarily
the only criteria of adverseness. A preferable standard would be a
presumption that any person has standing to sue upon alleging
administrative illegality unless: it can be shown that he has suffered no
injury, directly or indirectly; he has not previously demonstrated to
the agency an interest in the controversy sufficient to substantiate his
viewpoint as actually conflicting with the agency action; and there are
clearly more appropriate parties who are willing to litigate. The
appropriateness of parties could be determined by such criteria as
ability to sustain a suit and degree of demonstrable interest in the
subject matter. The effect of this standard is to assure that at least one
party will always be able to challenge the administrative action.',"
Injured parties and those showing a prior interest are given preferred
status because it is more likely that they will frame issues with the
necessary adverseness. The standard assumes that any party willing to
undergo the time and expense of a suit will have demonstrated his
adversity.106
The advantage of the suggested test is the assurance that judicial
control over administrative arbitrariness will not be frustrated by
standing criteria. Courts which presently constrict the availability of
the judicial forum will have difficulty denying standing under the
suggested standard since the likelihood that a litigant who is denied
standing on the basis of a restrictive interpretation of injury in fact
would also fail to meet the remaining criteria is slight. The pervasive
spirit of liberality inherent in this standard would make such
restricted opinions suspect on appeal as well. By breaking totally
away from tests meant to limit the availability of the judicial forum' 7
103. Id. at 101.
164. See 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
105. Professor Jaffe contends that the use of public plaintiffs, citizens or taxpayers, would

enable the courts to adjudicate important or urgent legal questions which are presently
unresolved due to the lack of a "conventional" plaintiff. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HAv. L.

REv. 633, 637-38 (197 1). He suggests that when a plain'tiff does not have a "protected interest"
under the DataProcessingstandard, he does not have a right to review. However, such a plaintiff

may find his suit entertained by the court if it deems the disposition of the case to be in the public
interest. Id. Of course, Jaffe's proposed standard encounters the objections to judicial
arbitrariness noted earlier.
106. See 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 206, 210 (1970).
107. See the discussion of the "zone of interests" test in Data Processing.397 U.S. at 153-
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and shifting to tests designed to assure both adverseness and a check
on the administrative process, the courts would be offered the
opportunity to better safeguard both the public interest and that of
private litigants.
IX.

JUDICIAL REVIEW-ACTIONS REVIEWABLE

SEC Non-A ction Decision Constitutes "Reviewable Order"
In Medical Committee For Human Rights v. SEC' the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
a Securities and Exchange Commission decision not to object to Dow
Chemical Company's 2 exclusion of a stockholder's proposal from
proxy materials was a judicially reviewable order. The Medical
Committee for Human Rights, a Dow stockholder, had requested
that a resolution to amend the Dow charter to bar the sale of napalm,
unless assurances were given that it would not be employed to injure
humans, be included in the proxy materials sent to stockholders for
the 1968 annual meeting. Dow rejected the Medical Committee's
request, relying on SEC proxy rules 14a-8(c)(2) and 14a-8(c)(5). 3 The
Medical Committee then revised its proposal to resolve that Dow
stockholders request that the board of directors consider the
1. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1971)
(No. 1162).
2. In late 1967 the Dow Chemical Company was a target of antiwar demonstrations,
directed primarily at Dow recruiters visiting college campuses, as students objected to the
company's manufacture of napalm for use in the Vietnam conflict. U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP.,
Dec. 18, 1967, at 8. Dow faced a different type of protest against its manufacture of napalm
when a stockholder proposed an amendment to the company's certificate of incorporation which
would have precluded the sale of napalm in the absence of assurance of nonuse against humans.
Letter from Quentin D. Young, National Chairman, Medical Committee for Human Rights, to
Secretary, Dow Chemical Company, Mar. 11, 1968, found in Certificate of Transcript of
Record at la-3a, Medical Committee v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Record]. The stockholder's objections to the sale of napalm were based primarily on
"concerns for human life," but concern was also expressed for the company's business future
because of its difficulty in recruiting capable college graduates. Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1970). The Commission's proxy rules provide a procedure for
submission of individual stockholder proposals to corporate management for inclusion in the
corporation's proxy statement. Id. § 240.14a-8. Under these rules an otherwise properly
submitted stockholder proposal may be excluded by management when it is submitted
"primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes," id. at 8(c)(2), or when it asks management to "take action with respect to a
matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the [company]." Id. at
8(c)(5). When a company decides to exclude a proposal it must file with the SEC a copy of the
proposal, any stockholder statement in support thereof, and management's reasons for
exclusion, supported by opinions of counsel when the exclusion is based on matters of law. Id. at
8(d).

